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Japan's Black Ship
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Japan-China War:

The Naval Battle of Haiyang.

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

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17th Sept. 1894.



ENTRANCE TO THE IMPERIAL CASTLE OF TOKYO.





THE
JAPAN-CHINA WAR:

THE
NAVAL BATTLE OF HAIYANG.

COMPILED FROM OFFICIAL AND OTHER SOURCES,

BY
JUKICHI INOUE.

With Numerous ColloTYPE Plates

BY
K. OGAWA.

KELLY AND WALSH, LIMITED,
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TO VINU
AIRBORNE

PREFACE.

The naval battle fought between the Japanese and Chinese squadrons in the Yellow Sea between the Islands of Talu and Haiyang on the 17th September, 1894, will be memorable in the annals of naval warfare, as it was the first engagement of the kind since modern warships were constructed. Its results have been studied with the keenest interest by naval experts and the world at large as it gave them some idea of a sea fight with the great men-of-war, ordnance, and armaments which the powers of Europe and America are vying with each other to perfect on hitherto purely theoretical grounds or on trials and experiments under certain prearranged and fixed conditions. They had never been tested by actual warfare. It was, therefore, natural that the naval authorities of the various powers should be eager to note the course of the naval fight off Haiyang as it offered them a unique opportunity of testing the theories and inductions they had been acting on in the construction of their navies.

But to the two belligerent powers whose fleets thus put to serious proof the productions of Western naval science, the memorable battle was of momentous importance. To Japan, at all events, it was a perfect revelation, in respect, not so much of the *matériel*, as of the *personnel* of her navy. Three or four years ago, the Japanese naval service was the object of acrimonious attacks from certain sections of Japanese Parliament and Press. The warships were declared to be defective, and the naval officers to have been selected and promoted on the strength of their clan and family connections, and not of their actual merit or capacity. These accusations were partially, if not wholly, believed to be well-founded. Parliament refused its sanction when Vice-Admiral Viscount Kabayama, the Naval Minister at the time, presented his programme for the enlargement of the Japanese navy. There appeared to be a general conviction that a guarantee was necessary for the greater efficiency of the navy before Parliament could grant the supplies for the construction of warships. The Commons, therefore, turned a deaf ear to Viscount Kabayama's eloquent appeal in December, 1890.

When the Japanese accused their naval officers of incapacity, they never doubted their valour or intrepidity. The very fact that the ex-retainers of the Satsuma clan were all-powerful in the navy implied that, from the war-like reputation of that clan, brave officers were not wanting in the naval service; but what the Japanese feared was that these men would be reckless in displaying their valour and from want of scientific knowledge and technical skill endanger the ships under their command. Seven centuries of feudalism had infused such a martial spirit into the nation as was not likely to be eradicated by twenty-five years of the new regime. Japan never had any apprehensions of the failure of her soldiers and sailors on the field of battle. The history of Japan teems with examples of dauntless valour and unflinching fortitude, which, recounted in romances, represented on the stage, or narrated in the storytellers' halls, have never failed to fire their readers, or audiences, with a spirit of emulation. It is justly boasted by the Japanese that in no other country are the lower classes so familiar with the lives of its great warriors and rulers; for this the preference given on the stage to historical plays and the popularity of historical story-tellers' halls are greatly responsible. The size and compactness of Japan has given the nation a deep sense of brotherhood throughout all classes, in addition to the fact that the sudden emergence of the country after centuries of absolute isolation, exposing it to the curious and suspicious gaze of the world, has awakened it to the necessity of self-reliance. Finally, the Japanese are imbued with the most concrete form of patriotism, as the love of their country is to them practically identical with loyalty to their Emperor; and loyalty has always been the highest of virtues, fostered and exalted as it was by the clan system. Ancestral worship, too, had its effect, for there is no greater dishonour to the Japanese than the thought that his ancestors would blush in the shades for his action. A man, then, in whose heart these principles and ideas are deeply instilled could not but be brave and fight to death rather than yield an inch to the enemy.

The Japanese, therefore, had no fear that their warriors on land and sea would prove themselves unworthy of the martial traditions of their country. Their apprehensions were based on what too often accompanies intrepidity,—rashness. Their very fearlessness might make them rush heedlessly into positions from which they could not extricate themselves without serious loss. But these natural apprehensions have proved groundless. The Japanese army has been deservedly lauded

for the perfection of its organisation, celerity of its mobilisation, and precision of its movements. The battles of Pingyang and Hooshan showed the strategic skill of its general staff. These encomiums, merited as they were, have given Japan unbounded pleasure as they proved to her that in addition to her native valour, she has gained a complete mastery of European military science. The army, however, has always been regarded as highly efficient, and Japan never thought for a moment that it would ever be defeated. With the navy, the case was quite different. The Japanese have never been great sailors, the laws of the Tokugawa Government having prohibited the construction of large ships. It was possible, then, that the Japanese officers might, by their defective navigation and unskilful manœuvres, run their warships into danger. The battle of Haiyang has, however, dispelled these fears. Their scientific precision and unity of movement has extorted unwilling praise from their enemies. It has belied the charges of incompetence brought against the Japanese naval officers. It has proved that Japan can rely on her navy as implicitly as she has relied on her army. This assurance has come as a revelation upon the nation; and the naval victory has been received with infinite enthusiasm not merely as a Japanese success, but also as a proof of the high efficiency of the Japanese navy. The dash and 'go' of the Japanese have always been admitted by Japanese and foreigner alike; but precision and thoroughness as integral traits of the Japanese character are the new discoveries made by the present war.

The battle of Haiyang, characterised as it was by Japanese cool courage, was not without incidents revealing the innate intrepidity, not to say recklessness, of the Japanese. The *Saikyo*, a merchantman, which, until a few months previously had carried peaceful passengers between the ports of Japan, is an instance in point. Such a frail steamer defying the armoured warships of China almost takes one's breath away; yet, nothing but admiration is due to the skill with which she parried the torpedoes sent against her. The *Saikyo*, as she was leaving the scene of battle in a damaged condition, had yet leisure to take photographs of the battle. There were other incidents illustrating that devotion to duty and to the common cause which is perhaps more imperative in a warship than in any other place or condition. The calmness with which the officers and men on the *Akagi* stepped into the vacancies caused by the enemy's fire deserves the highest praise.

The marines on the *Matsushima* too proved themselves worthy of their country's gratitude.

The Japanese official reports of the battle have so far been slight, though no doubt when the war is concluded, the naval authorities will publish a full and complete report. But wanting such, the following Japanese account has been compiled from the published official reports, supplemented with such details as have been supplied by the war correspondents of the Tokyo press. Their descriptions are in many respects incomplete; and judicious sifting has been necessary for the presentation of a consistent account, though discrepancies occur mostly on minor points. It has been more difficult to get a satisfactory account from the Chinese point of view. The foreign press in China ports have given particulars of the fight; but they have been obtained from the foreign naval employes who were actually engaged in the battle. These foreigners' statements are no doubt trustworthy so far as their actual observations are concerned; but these men were mostly employed in subordinate positions and all their attention was naturally given to their special sphere of duty, so that they had no opportunity of observing what was going on in those parts of their ships where their presence was not required, and still less of the action of other Chinese ships and of the Japanese. This explains the discrepancies as regards the sequence of events in their accounts. The *North China Daily News*' report which is given in the following pages is valuable for its description of the goings-on on the Chinese vessels in which foreigners were employed. Otherwise the preference for accuracy must be given to the Japanese account. Take, for instance, the alleged sinking of a Japanese warship by the *Chih-yuen* and the *King-yuen*. This vessel is now known to have been the *Akagi*, which, though much damaged as may be seen from the plates, still managed to return to Nagasaki. All the Japanese men-of-war which took part in the naval battle, were present, except the *Hiyei*, when Taliénwan was taken by the Japanese army on November 7th, so that it is certain that whatever injuries they may have suffered in the battle, they were in full trim again by the end of October. The *Hiyei* was also repaired and in active service elsewhere on November 7th. The *Saikyo* has been left unrepaired; and it is said that she will be preserved in her damaged condition as a memento of the great naval engagement of Haiyang on September 17th.

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The Naval Battle of Haiyang.



THE JAPANESE ACCOUNT.



ON the 10th September, the Japanese squadrons left the temporary base of operations convoying 30 transports. Vice-Admiral Viscount Kabayama, Chief of the Naval General Staff, was on board the *Saikyo*. As the day was the 220th day of the farmer's calendar, one of the most important days in rice-cultivation, which has a direct influence on harvest-prospects, the sea was not so calm as usual.

On the 14th, the transports arrived at their destination in Caroline Bay, where the third flying squadron, consisting of the men-of-war *Kongo*, *Takao*, *Yamato*, *Musashi*, *Katsuragi*, and *Tenryu* covered the landing of the troops. On the same evening, the rest left for the Taidong River, where they arrived on the following morning. Here the Japanese Admiral heard that the van of the army had already commenced the attack on Pingyang. The men-of-war *Chokai*, *Maya*, *Tsukushi*, and *Banjo* were sent up the river to assist the army, while the main and the first flying squadrons anchored at Cape Shoppek. On the afternoon of the 16th, the two squadrons, accompanied by the despatch-boat *Akagi* and the merchant cruiser *Saikyo-maru* weighed anchor to reconnoitre the Island of Haiyang and the mouth of the River Tayang. They had expected when they left the cape to meet the enemy, but did not by any means anticipate such a great battle as actually took place on the following day. They did not wait for the return of the torpedo-boats which had gone up the Taidong to assist the army.

On the 17th, at 6.30 a.m., the squadrons arrived off the island and the *Akagi* was ordered to reconnoitre the inlets of the island; but as there was nothing noticeable about the harbours, they advanced towards Talu Island, off Takooshan, a little past nine. Soon, however, cries of the enemy in sight were raised as streaks of smoke were seen on the E.N.E., that is, on the starboard bow of the squadron. At 11.40, the Chinese squadron came into sight. Admiral Ito signalled to the *Akagi* and *Saikyo-maru* to move to the left of the squadrons so as to be under cover. The Japanese men-of-war then made instant preparations for battle, the crew hastily finishing their meal.

At noon, the Japanese fleet was 12 miles to the N.E. by N. of Talu Island. Their actual position was 39 deg. 10 min. N. Lat., and 123 deg. 5 min. E. Long.

A report was received from the mast-head that the enemy's centre was taken by the two largest ships. These were the famous *Ting-yuen* and *Chen-yuen*. The rest of the fleet were also the strongest of the Peiyang Squadron.

The Japanese flying squadron advanced towards the enemy's centre, but soon after veered to the left to assail the enemy's right. The main squadron underwent similar manœuvres. The Chinese came in a single irregular rank, and afterwards they formed a wedge with the great battleships at the apex. The *Ting-yuen* and *Chen-yuen* were in the centre, next to them on either side were ships of the *Lai-yuen* and *King-yuen* type, followed by the *Ching-yuen* and *Chih-yuen*, thus both wings being made of smaller vessels in the order of magnitude. The total strength of the Chinese was twelve. The two hostile squadrons were

ON THE JAPANESE SIDE :—

THE FIRST FLYING OR ADVANCE SQUADRON.

	TONNAGE.	SPEED. KNOTS.
<i>Yoshino</i> - - - - -	4,267	22½
<i>Takachiho</i> - - - - -	3,709	19
<i>Naniwa</i> - - - - -	3,709	19
<i>Akitsushima</i> - - - - -	3,150	19

Of this squadron, the flagship was the *Yoshino*, which was commanded by Rear-Admiral Tsuboi.

THE MAIN SQUADRON.

<i>Matsushima</i> - - - - -	4,278	16
<i>Itsukushima</i> - - - - -	4,278	16
<i>Hashidate</i> - - - - -	4,278	16
<i>Chiyoda</i> - - - - -	2,439	19
<i>Fuso</i> - - - - -	3,777	13
<i>Hiyei</i> - - - - -	2,284	12
<i>Akagi</i> - - - - -	622	12
<i>Saikyo</i> - - - - -	1,652	17

The Commander of the Combined Squadrons was Vice-Admiral Ito, Commander of the Standing Squadron, who was on board the *Matsushima*.

ON THE CHINESE SIDE.

		TONNAGE.	SPEED.
<i>Ting-yuen</i>	<i>Torpedoed at Wei hai wei</i>	7,335	14½
<i>Chen-yuen</i>	<i>Captured at " " "</i>	7,335	14½
<i>Lai-yuen</i>	<i>Torpedoed " " "</i>	2,900	14
<i>Ping-yuen</i>	<i>Captured " " "</i>	2,000	14
<i>Ching-yuen</i>	<i>Sunk by Jap force at " " "</i>	2,300	18
<i>Chih-yuen</i>	<i>Sunk at Yaloo</i>	2,300	18
<i>King-yuen</i>	<i>Sunk at Yaloo</i>	2,900	15½
<i>Chao-yung</i>	<i>Sunk at Yaloo</i>	1,350	15
<i>Yang-wei</i>	<i>Sunk at Yaloo</i>	1,350	15
<i>Tsi-yuen</i>	<i>Captured at Wei hai wei</i>	1,300	12
<i>Kwang-chia</i>	<i>Destroyed near Talcunwan</i>	1,296	14.7
<i>Kwang-ping</i>	<i>Captured at Wei hai wei</i>	1,000	15

The flagship *Ting-yuen* was commanded by Admiral Ting-Joochang.

The *Kwang-ping* and *Ping-yuen* separated from the squadron and went westward while the remainder advanced in order. This was evidently to divert the attention of the Japanese and divide their strength; but while the *Ting-yuen* and *Chen-yuen* were in sight the Japanese hardly paid attention to the smaller vessels.

At 12.03, the Japanese Imperial Naval flag was hoisted on the main mast as a signal for commencing the battle. Preparations for firing were made.

At 12.19, the Japanese Admiral signalled that the men-of-war should fire when the enemy came within a suitable range. They were not to waste their powder. At 12.30, the flying squadron, which had been ordered to attack the enemy's right, advanced at the rate of ten knots an hour. At 12.45, when the hostile squadrons were at 6,000 metres' distance from each other, the Chinese opened fire. The flying squadron then increased its speed to fourteen knots; and though it was exposed to incessant fire, it continued to advance until it was at 3,000 metres, when it replied for the first time at 1.05. The flying squadron directed especial attention to the *Chao-yung* and the *Yang-wei*, the two extreme vessels of the Chinese right wing. As these were seen to feel the deadly effects of the Japanese fire, the flying squadron continued to attack them until it was within 1,600 metres of them. The *Chao-yung* caught fire and she listed on the starboard. She sank soon after. The flying squadron, having now passed the Chinese squadron, veered at 1.20

sixteen points to port. It was then ordered to return to the main squadron.

In the meanwhile, as the main squadron advanced at ten knots, with the enemy on the port, and covering the two ships *Akagi* and *Saikyo*, the *Hiyei* which could not maintain that speed, got far behind the rest; the *Fuso* which brought up the rear kept close to her. As the main squadron was passing the Chinese, the latter closed upon the *Hiyei*. The *Ting-yuen* and the *Fing-yuen* were within 700 metres, and poured broadsides upon her. The Chinese vessels were so close together that they began to be afraid of hitting each other, and stopped firing.

The commander of the *Hiyei*, fearing the enemy would ram her if she continued her course, boldly turned her prow towards the space between the *Ting-yuen* and *King-yuen*, and advanced. She was at one time only 500 metres from them. Two torpedoes were discharged at her, but they crossed her path only ten or twelve metres from her stern; and so were ineffective. She fought with several of the enemy's ships and passing through them, rejoined the main squadron. It was finely done. At this time, the main squadron had passed the enemy, and changing the course to the right, manœuvred to get behind the enemy's squadron, which had now lost its line of battle.

Two more Chinese men-of-war, probably the *Chen-nan* and the *Chen-chung*, was seen at a distance; but they did not take part in the battle. There were also torpedo-boats; but they appear to have done little or nothing.

The *Hiyei* which had escaped the torpedoes, was attacked by the *Ting-yuen*, whose great shell struck the ward-room and killed a large number, including Chief Surgeon Miyake and Paymaster Ishizaka. The room was being used as a sick-room, and several patients were also instantly killed. At 1.55, the *Hiyei* signalled that she was on fire. The *Akagi*, which now joined her, had not fared any better. She had been ordered to keep up with the flagship; but being of low speed, she was soon left behind. She found herself alone when she saw the *Lai-yuen* and the rest of the Chinese left wing coming upon her, and already at 800 metres distance. Her starboard guns attacked them severely and cleared the men off the *Lai-yuen's* bridge. At this time, Lieut. Hirokatsu Sasaki, the captain of the first corps, was wounded, and the cadet, Kojiro Hashiguchi, was killed. At 1.20, the enemy's ships, which continued to pursue her, killed Commander Hachirota Sakamoto, the

commander of the ship, and two gunners of the first quick-firing gun, while two others were wounded. Lieut. Tetsutaro Sato, chief navigating officer, took the commander's place and superintended the vessel. Just then the enemy's shells which struck the lower deck, killed four firemen, wounded a fifth, and destroyed a steam-pipe, while another which struck the upper deck killed three gunners. When the *Lai-yuen*, *Chih-yuen*, and *Kwang-chia*, after passing behind her, were again about to attack her, the despatch-boat found the destruction of her steam-pipe completely cut off the supply of shells at the fore-castle. Ammunition could only be obtained from aft by doing away with the ventilating shaft. The vessel was in the greatest straits, but as her course was changed to port, she was at some distance from the enemy, and the Chief Engineer, Teiichi Hirabe, and his staff succeeded in making temporary repairs, and her speed was not lowered to any great extent. Though she were not close to the enemy at the time, they were seen advancing towards her at full speed. She was obliged to change her course to the south, firing all the time from the stern to arrest the pursuit. The first quick-firing gun was managed by signal men. The enemy's shells knocked down her main-mast, and the ship's flag was taken down and reset upon the stump of the mast, which had been cut off. At 2.15, the *Lai-yuen* and others were about 300 metres behind her. A shot from the *Lai-yuen* again struck her bridge and wounded the navigating officer, who had taken the commander's place. At this time, firing at the stern was strenuously kept up. Lieutenant Shuzo Matsuoka, the captain of the second corps, took command of the ship, while the first-class marine, Tayeji Shindo, took the lieutenant's post at the guns. At 2.20, the *Akagi's* fourth gun at the stern struck the *Lai-yuen's* stern deck and caused a great fire there. The enemy's vessels slowed down to aid the *Lai-yuen*, and the Japanese was soon 700 or 800 metres away from them. At 2.23, as the navigating officer's wounds had been dressed, he resumed his post on the bridge, and relieved Lieutenant Matsuoka. At 2.30, as the enemy had been distanced, the marines were ordered to rest, and slowing down, the crew began to mend the steam-pipe. At 2.40, the roll was called, and after supplying vacancies, orders were given for rest.

When the *Hiyei* and the *Akagi* were hard-pressed by the enemy, the Admiral signalled to the flying squadron to advance to their rescue. The *Saikyo* had got behind the flying squadron, as she found the *Chih-yuen*

and the *Kwang-ping* coming towards her from fore and aft. But when the flying squadron turned to starboard at 2.20 to aid the *Hyei* and the *Akagi*, she was confronted by the Chinese. Four 30½ c.m. shells from the *Ting-yuen*, two at a time, struck the upper deck saloon. Two passed through with no apparent effect; but the other two, which were common shells, exploded and shattered the woodwork, and destroyed the tubes connected with the steering-gear. The *Saikyo* signalled that her steering-gear was damaged. She passed between the *Akitsushima* and the *Naniwa* and coming upon the enemy's flank, met with a severe running-fire. The relieving-tackle was used, but difficulty was found in steering. The speed was lowered, but after fixing the hand-wheel, she advanced at full speed. At 2.23, the enemy's *Yang-wei* caught fire and was seen near Talu Island (probably stranded.)

At 2.30, the *Matsushima* and the *Ping-yuen* commenced firing at each other at 2,800 metres, and gradually approached until they were only 1,200 metres from each other. At 2.34, the *Ping-yuen's* 26 c.m. shell penetrated the *Matsushima's* officers' room and the central torpedo-room, killing four men at the portside discharger; and also exploded against the barrette. A shell, however, from the Japanese flagship disabled the *Ping-yuen's* 26 c.m. gun. The *Kwang-ping* and a torpedo-boat then joined the *Ping-yuen*, and all three turned their attention upon the *Saikyo*. At 2.50, they were 3,000 metres off on her starboard. She fired incessantly upon the torpedo-boat, which then steered for land. The *Ping-yuen* and the *Kwang-ping* exchanged shots with her at 500 metres. At 3.10, another torpedo-boat was seen ahead and advanced towards the *Saikyo*. When she was straight before her, the torpedo-boat discharged a torpedo from a tube at the bow; but it missed. Another discharged at 50 metres was equally ineffectual. They were most skilfully avoided by the *Saikyo*. The first came from the portside bow and penetrated the water across the vessel, but as the *Saikyo's* speed was great, the torpedo missed her; and the second passed along the starboard and sank far behind. As the torpedo-boat had crossed the *Saikyo's* path between the two discharges, the directions of the torpedoes had intersected each other. At 3.30, the *Saikyo* steered southward and was from that time out of action. Her encounter with the *Ping-yuen* and *Kwang-ping* had been very severe. During that engagement, she had received many shells, resulting in damages to the foremast and the first-class cabins below the quarter-deck. One of the shells had caused a fire

in these cabins, which was only extinguished after some injuries had been inflicted. Though the ship was much damaged, the wounded were few, there being absolutely none killed.

Meanwhile, the first flying squadron which had gone to the aid of the *Hiyei* and *Akagi*, had fired upon their assailants and, after passing them, steered to port. At 3.0, the *Matsushima* and the *Yoshino* faced each other on the starboard. The two Japanese squadrons had the enemy between them, and the fiercest encounter of the whole battle took place. A fire broke out on the flagship *Ting-yuen*, while her sister-ship seemed disposed to retreat. The Japanese squadrons pressed on them until a shell of the *Matsushima's* great 32 c.m. gun fell within 200 metres of the *Yoshino's* bow. They then went further apart to avoid each other's shells. At 3.30, the *Chih-yuen* was sunk; her starboard stern first listed, and she went down in five minutes amid cheers from the Japanese. About the same time, when the *Matsushima* faced the *Ting-yuen*, a shell from the Chinese flagship's 30½ c.m. gun struck her battery, knocking down the fourth (12 c.m.) gun from its supports and exploded on her heap of ammunition, by the explosion of which over sixty men were killed or wounded. Two 12 c.m. guns were disabled.

The hull listed slightly. A fire broke out at the same time, but it was immediately put out. The survivors and band-players were put to the guns. The hydraulic gear and valves were impaired; and the 32 c.m. gun was damaged, but soon repaired. Commander Mukoyama, the Vice-Commander of the flagship, has expressed his high admiration of the crew on board, especially their increased energy and courage when forty of their comrades had been slain. As an instance of their gallantry on this trying occasion, the following has been reported:—The shell which played such havoc on board burst on the lower deck, and the whole place was covered with smoke. The magazine just below was in imminent danger, as it was feared that it would catch fire and explode. A gunner's mate and an ordinary seaman in charge of the magazine were in peril of their lives. In spite of others' warning they still kept their stand, resolved to die at their post. The fiery smoke of the exploded shell threatened to invade the magazine through crevices; and all feared the magazine should immediately catch fire. But the two men in charge instantly stripped themselves and crammed in their clothes wherever they thought the fire would obtain ingress. By

their prompt action the magazine was saved and the *Matsushima* escaped a most serious danger.

During the fire on the *Ting-yuen*, the *Chen-yuen* which never left her side, ably aided and covered her. It was due to the *Chen-yuen's* skilful manœuvres that the Chinese flagship did not suffer more. On these two great battleships, the Japanese main squadron exerted its utmost. Its shells at 3,000 metres, those of the 32 c.m. gun excepted, could not penetrate the battleships' 14-inch armour. The first flying squadron went in pursuit of the *Tsi-yuen* and the rest of the Chinese squadron, which began to fly in the direction opposite to that of the battleships. The *Lai-yuen* caught fire; and seeing her sorry plight, the flying squadron pressed on her sister ship *King-yuen* which was still active. At 3.52, when she was 3,100 metres to the north, the *Takachiho* fired at her; and when at from 2,300 to 2,500 metres, the *Yoshino* opened on the vessel her three 15-c.m. automatic quick-firing guns at the bow, until she was 1,800 metres off. They told with deadly effect. At 4.48, the *King-yuen* listed on the starboard; and two fires suddenly broke out at the stern and amidships. The water-line became visible on port-side and the rudder becoming useless, the vessel described swift but aimless curves. The stern then dipped deep in water and after an explosion,—probably the bursting of her boilers,—amid a thick volume of black smoke, the *King-yuen* disappeared altogether. This was a unique case of a battleship being sunk by a cruiser; and it was no doubt due to the efficiency of the *Yoshino's* new quick firing guns and of the cordite she had used.

It was now 'close on sunset. The flying squadron was recalled. The *Akagi*, whose damaged steampipe had at length been mended, joined the main squadron at 5.50. Both the *Saikyo* and the *Hiei* had gone back to the base of operations. The *Matsushima* was sent to the Japanese admiralty port of Kure, while the Admiral's flag was transferred to her sister-ship *Hashidate*. As the Chinese torpedo boats had joined the *Chen-yuen* and *Ting-yuen*, a night engagement would have been disadvantageous to the Japanese. They, therefore, followed them at a distance. The *Ting-yuen's* fire was at length extinguished. The Japanese decided to wait till morning and intercept the enemy on their way to Wei-hai-wei whither they appeared to be bound. They cautiously advanced towards that port; but at dawn failed to catch a glimpse of the enemy.

Early on the 18th, the squadrons returned to the scene of the previous day's battle. The *Yang-wei*, which was seen stranded was destroyed with a torpedo from the *Chiyoda*. The *Akagi* was ordered in the morning to return to the temporary base of operations, whither the Japanese squadrons also returned safely on the following morning. Fuel, provisions, and ammunition were taken on board ; and preparations were made for another engagement, should the enemy offer a second opportunity. Then the *Naniwa* and the *Akitsushima* were sent westward to reconnoitre Wei-hai-wei, Chefoo, and Port Arthur. The enemy's warships, fearing another attack, had apparently concealed themselves in harbours, for they were not to be seen. As the defences of Port Arthur were very strict, a complete reconnoitre of that port could not be effected ; but the enemy's squadron appeared to be ensconced within. At the mouth of Talien Bay, the scouts saw two of the enemy's men-of-war. One of them, which was probably the *Tsi-yuen*, hurriedly fled into harbour as soon as she saw the Japanese ships ; but the other, *Kwang-chia*, of the Fuhkien Squadron, had apparently run ashore in trying to escape from the naval battle. As she was, therefore, unable to move, her crew, fearing her falling into the hands of the Japanese, exploded and destroyed her. The quickness with which this destruction was effected certainly deserves praise.

The news of this naval battle was received with unbounded enthusiasm in Japan ; and H. M. the Emperor of Japan sent the following congratulatory message to Vice-Admiral Ito, Commander of the Combined Squadrons :—" We hear that Our combined squadrons fought bravely in the Yellow Sea and obtained a great victory, and perceive that their power will command the enemy's seas. And deeply appreciating the services of Our officers and men, We are delighted with the extraordinary results they have obtained."

Soon after, Commander Saito, the Naval Chamberlain, was also sent to the Squadron to convey His Majesty's congratulations and to give a full report on the memorable battle.

Among the Japanese men-of-war, the most damaged were the *Matsushima* and the *Hiyei*. The *Matsushima* had received on her battery two 30½ c.m. shells, one of which penetrated from one side to the other and fell into the sea, while the other struck a heap of more than a hundred shells of the 12 c.m. quick-firing guns, causing at the same time a fire, which, however, was soon extinguished. Over 60 were killed

or wounded. The 30½ c.m. shell with which the *Hiyei* was struck, penetrated one side and exploded on the lower deck, destroying the aft-mast and causing a fire. Several men were killed or wounded.

The principal damages done to the Japanese men-of-war were as follows :—

Matsushima.—Besides the two shells just mentioned, one 26-c.m. shell penetrated the torpedo-room, and the another struck a Hotchkiss quick-firing gun.

Hiyei.—Besides the one above mentioned, a shell on upper deck killed four gunners.

Naniwa.—A shell near water-line. An explosion in the coal-bunker, but without any serious damage.

Chiyoda.—A shell above water line penetrated the hull.

Itsukushima.—A shell in torpedo-room ; another half-way up the mast ; and a third in engine-room.

Hashidate.—A 15 c.m. shell exploded against the 32 c.m. gun barbette.

Akagi.—A shell on topmast ; and another on bridge, killing the commander.

Saikyo.—Received many shells ; but the most dangerous was the one which struck the upper deck saloon. If it had struck ten feet forward, the engine-room would have been destroyed and the ship lost control. She was certainly terribly damaged ; and one of the most remarkable lessons of the battle is the amount of injuries a lightly-armed passenger steamer can bear without sinking. The shells which struck her were the following :—

KIND OF SHELL.	No.	DAMAGED.
30.5 c.m.	4	Mainmast and piano-room.
21.0 c.m.	1	Mainmast and piano-room.
15.0 c.m.	2	Quarterdeck and boat-davit.
12.0 c.m.	1	Between mainmast and engine-room.
12.0 c.m.	1	Exploded near a rudder on stern maindeck.
12.0 c.m.	1	Foremast derrick.
12.0 c.m.	1	Funnel.
6 lbs. and less	Over 10.	

The 12 c.m. shell which exploded near the rudder on the stern maindeck struck against the stanchions and its pieces set fire to the clothes store. But the fire was extinguished. Though the *Saikyo* was thus severely damaged, the enemy's shells missed her vital parts and the vessel was enabled to arrive at Ujina, near Kure, without further mishap.

When the *Akagi* and *Hiyei* arrived at Nagasaki previously to their

going in dock for repairs, the Nagasaki *Rising Sun* newspaper gave the following description of their damages :—Judging by the outward appearance of the *Hiyei* and *Akagi*, which are said to have borne the brunt of the fight, in company with the *Matsushima*, much cannot be said in favour of Chinese marksmanship, if that is the best their gunners can do in a comparatively close-range engagement lasting about five hours. The *Hiyei* has a large round shot-hole in her stern, three smaller splintered holes amidships on the port side, and one on the starboard side. The *Akagi* has lost her main-mast, the falling of which is said to have caused the death of her commander, her funnel is badly riddled, and there are several shot-holes abreast of the main-mast on the starboard side.

The Japanese *Official Gazette* gives the following table of the returns made on the 17th November, 1894, of the officers and men of the Japanese men-of-war, who were killed or wounded in the naval action :—

	KILLED.	WOUNDED.	DIED BEFORE ENTERING HOSPITAL.	DIED IN HOSPITAL.	RECOVERED.	DISCHARGED FROM SERVICE.	IN HOSPITAL.	WOUNDS TOO SLIGHT TO ENTER HOSPITAL.	DEATHS, TOTAL.	TOTAL KILLED AND WOUNDED.
<i>Matsushima</i>	2 33	5 71	1 17	0 4	1 16	0 0	1 20	2 14	3 54	7* 104
<i>Chiyoda</i>	—	—	None.						—	—
<i>Itsukushima</i>	0 13	1 17	0 1	0 0	1 4	0 0	0 6	0 6	0 14	1* 30
<i>Hashidate</i>	2 1	0 9	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 3	0 6	2 1	2* 10
<i>Hiyei</i>	3 16	3 34	0 2	0 2	0 8	0 0	0 8	3 14	3 20	6* 50
<i>Fuso</i>	0 2	2 10	0 2	1 0	0 0	0 0	1 5	0 3	1 4	2* 12
<i>Yoshino</i>	0 1	2 9	1 0	0 0	0 2	0 0	0 2	1 5	1 1	2* 10
<i>Takachiho</i>	0 1	0 2	0 0	0 0	0 1	0 1	0 0	0 0	0 1	0* 3
<i>Akitsushima</i>	1 4	0 10	0 0	0 0	1 0	0 0	0 8	0 1	1 4	1* 14
<i>Naniwa</i>	0 0	0 1	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 1	0 0	0* 1
<i>Akagi</i>	2 9	2 15	0 0	0 0	0 2	0 0	0 8	2 5	2 9	4* 24
<i>Saikyo</i>	0 0	1 10	0 0	0 1	0 0	0 0	0 1	1 8	0 1	1* 10
Total	10 80	16 188	2 22	1 7	2 34	0 1	2 61	9 63	13 109	26* 268

The figures in the rows marked with asterisks are those of officers and cadets.

The Naval Chamberlain's report gives the following as the damages to the Chinese squadron :—

The *Chao-yung* received great injuries from the Japanese shells, and

was unable to move freely. A fire broke out in the vessel, which was soon enveloped in flames and finally sank.

The *Yang-wei* was greatly injured by the Japanese shells, and a fire broke out on board, but she managed to move about, until she was stranded. According to the report of the *Chiyoda*, which was sent to examine her, there were 15 marks of shells upwards of 12 c.m., four feet or more below the upper deck on the portside amidships. On the upper deck the marks were innumerable; but the fire had so confused the marks that it was impossible to count them. The honey-combed condition of the ventilator, brought back to Hiroshima, proves that many shells had taken effect.

The *Chih-yuen's* condition was much like the *Chao-yung's*. She heeled on the starboard and sank. Her screws were seen to revolve out of water.

The *King-yuen* was first attacked by the *Yoshino*, whose shells were so effective that the ship listed forward on the portside. The rest of the first flying squadron, that is, the *Takachiho*, *Akitsuishima*, and *Naniwa*, followed and attacked her so severely that a great fire broke out on board. A large volume of smoke arose; and the vessel moved sometimes to the starboard and sometimes to the port. She was evidently unable to steer. Afterwards, the vessel listed on the starboard, and finally, showing her keel, sank.

The *Ting-yuen* had the whole of her barbette on fire through the Japanese shells, and the smoke enveloped the whole vessel. She was just able to move. The fire lasted two hours. When the battle was but half over, the 15 c.m. gun on the stern was the only one she could fire. During the fight, the mainmast was broken in two and the admiral's flag fell. It was not seen hoisted again.

The *Lai-yuen* was also set on fire by the Japanese shells. The smoke covered the aft-half of the ship; and the fire lasted an hour and a half. She did not, however, lose freedom of movement. The fire was produced by the *Akagi's* stern gun, when that vessel was hard-beset by the Chinese.

The *Chen-yuen*. When the five vessels, excluding the *Hiyei*, of the Japanese main squadron, fought with the *Ting-yuen* and the *Chen-yuen*, the first flying squadron had gone in pursuit of the enemy's warships which had taken to flight, and was therefore separated from the main squadron. It is asserted that the *Chen-yuen* skilfully covered the flagship *Ting-yuen*, which was almost unable to move on account of the fire. The *Chen-yuen* continued firing till the end of the battle.

The *Ching-yuen*, *Ping-yuen*, and *Kwang-ping* took to flight. Though no damages were noticed on their exterior, they appeared on the whole unable to fire their principal guns.

The *Tsi-yuen* fled far away from the commencement of the battle. As she was only exposed to a short attack from the *Naniwa*, she probably received but little damage. The *Tsi-yuen* did not from the first fire her principal guns.

The *Kwang-chia*, when fleeing from the fight, struck on a dangerous reef outside Talienwan. On the 23rd September, the *Naniwa* and *Akitsu-shima*, when reconnoitring, were seen coming; and the vessel was destroyed by its own explosion. At low tide, several feet of the hull is still to be seen; two masts having fallen, only the mainmast stands at present.

The *Chen-nan* and the *Chen-chung* kept at a distance with the torpedo-boats and did not engage in the fight. They were, therefore, probably uninjured.

THE CHINESE ACCOUNT.

There has been no reliable Chinese official report of the naval battle. The only accounts worth noting have been compiled from the statements made by the foreigners who were engaged on the Chinese men-of-war in that battle. These men were altogether eight in number. Major von Hanneken was with Admiral Ting in the *Ting-yuen*. One of the men was killed, another went down in the *Chih-yuen*, and only two were unhurt. The remaining four, including Major von Hanneken, were more or less wounded.

The *North China Daily News* of Shanghai, a paper which has consistently upheld the Chinese cause throughout the war, has given the following description, which may be taken as the account most favourable to China:—

“The Japanese all through the war have shown that their Intelligence Department is excellently worked, and there can be no reasonable doubt that they received accurate information as to the destination of the 4,000 troops and large quantities of rice and military stores which left Taku about the 14th of September in the steamers *Hsinyu*, *Toonan*, *Chintung*, *Leeyuen*, and *Haeting*. These vessels picked up their convoy and made for Tatungkow under an escort of six cruisers and four torpedo-boats; when off Talienwan Bay they were joined by the larger

vessels of the Chinese fleet and made their destination on Sunday, the 16th of September. The debarkation began under cover of the torpedo vessels and two of the lesser-draught ships and was successfully accomplished, while the other nine vessels of the fleet remained in 25 fathoms some 10 or 12 miles S. by E. Tatungkow (Lat. 39.63 N., Long. 124.9 E). It must be noted that the Admiralty chart of 1860 is altogether wrong in the local topography; not only does it miss the Tatung altogether but it misplaces the Yalu, and is utterly misleading both in the soundings and chartography of the whole coast thereabouts. The Japanese, with that prevision which precludes the element of luck, carefully surveyed the coast two or three years ago; the harbour master of Port Arthur has repeatedly urged the Chinese to follow their example but without success.

"Steam was kept up, when at noon on Monday, the 17th of September, a cloud of that obtrusive black smoke which Japanese coal gives off showed the approach of their fleet from the south; the Admiral at once weighed anchor, drew up his squadron in a formation roughly like an obtuse angle with the two armoured ships at the apex, and advanced to give battle. The Japanese came on in line and carried out a series of evolutions with beautiful precision; the tactics of both sides are too highly technical for the lay mind to grasp; but in common speech they may be resolved into this. (1) The Japanese having higher speed—the modern equivalent to the weather-gauge—kept circling around the Chinese, enlarging their radius as they came within range of the big guns of the armoured *Ting-yuen* and *Chen-yuen* and coming closer in as they came opposite the unarmoured ships and guns of less calibre. (2) The Chinese kept their wedge formation, but as all the halyards were shot away in the Admiral's ship early in the action, they had simply to watch the leaders and act at discretion.

"The very first evolution of the enemy detached three Chinese ships, one of which was the fine Elswick cruiser *Chih-yuen* (2,300 tons, 18 knots, three 8" twelve-ton guns, two 6" four-ton, and 17 quick-firers). Captain Tang handled his ship with admirable coolness, his vessel was badly hulled very early in the fight and took a strong list to starboard; seeing she was sinking he went full speed ahead at a Japanese, who was sticking to him like a limpet, and making free practice, with the intention of ramming her, but he foundered with all hands (250) just before the ship got home. One account has it that he actually did sink the

Japanese, but the weight of evidence is that he only disabled him by his return fire.

"The *King-yuen* (2,870 tons, 16½ knots, two 8¼" ten-ton guns, two 6" four-tons, and seven machine guns) took fire soon after this, but her captain while subduing the flames still fought the ship. Seeing a disabled Japanese near him (most probably the same vessel that the *Chih-yuen* tried to ram) he came up intending to capture or sink her, but was incautious enough to cross the line of her torpedo tube at a short distance. The Japanese thereupon shot her only bolt and sure enough blew the *King-yuen* up; out of a complement of 270 odd, some seven only are known to have escaped. One account says that this fine vessel perished from fire, but subsequent information from Port Arthur gives this more accurate version of her end, though it is true she was badly on fire. With regard to this disabled Japanese not one of our informants here will deliberately say "I myself saw her founder," but without exception they all maintain that she sank soon after the destruction of the *King-yuen*. The notorious Fong, the reinstated captain of the *Tsi-yuen*, again distinguished himself by his devotion to the white feather; all the foreign survivors are very silent on this subject, but there is no doubt whatever that this poor creature signalled early in the day that his ship was badly struck, and that he then promptly took her out of action. In doing so he ran precipitately into the shallows, where the Elswick-built cruiser *Yang-wei* (1,350 tons, 16 knots, two 10", twenty-five-ton guns, four 4½", ten machine guns) was in difficulties, struggling hard to get off. Fong's navigation and pilotage were about equal to his courage; finding his soundings suddenly change he altered his helm and fairly rammed his unhappy colleague; escaping himself, however, with a damaged bow. The *Yang-wei's* crew (? 150) were nearly all lost, and the vessel herself now lies in about 4½ fathoms on a straight keel, with her tops and lighter guns out of the water, and her turret or barbette just awash. She was seen in that position four days after the battle by the returning transports. The *Tsi-yuen* ran at full speed for Port Arthur, when the foreign engineer came ashore and flatly refused to serve further with such a captain.* News has since arrived in Tientsin that he will

* Mr. Hoffmann, the Superintending Engineer of the *Tsi-yuen*, who is the foreigner referred to, has made, however, the following statement in the *Shanghai China Gazette*:—"We accomplished the journey (to Tatungkow) in safety, landed the troops,

be under no necessity of doing so; as Fong's head was promptly sheared off by imperative order from Tientsin. His villainous example was followed by the commander of the wooden corvette *Kwang-chia* (1,100 tons, three 12-c.m. quick-firing guns, eight machine guns). It is a moot point whether his ship was injured in the action or not; he shows the wood work of the latrines (*absit omen*) as a proof; at any rate he bolted, and kept so keen an eye aft that at 11 p.m. he ran on to a reef some 20 miles E. of Talienwan Bay, and for all that is known he is there still, although there is a rumour that a Japanese scout has since put a torpedo into him.

"The desertion of these two ships would have reduced the Chinese to seven, but they were reinforced by the vessels from inshore and later on by the torpedo vessels, four in number. One of these two ships, the *Yang-wei*, was, as we have seen, rammed by the *Tsi-yuen*, the other the *Chao-yung*, a sister ship, soon took fire and also got into shoal water where she burnt completely out; more than 100 men were taken and about 11 o'clock on the 17th ultimo, the whole fleet got up anchor and prepared to return to China. A short distance outside the mouth of the river we met the Japanese fleet, and a battle followed which lasted till 5.30 in the evening. It was the most tremendous fight I had ever dreamt about. Captain Fong fought the *Tsi-yuen* with courage and ability. We had seven or eight men killed on board, and continued firing away as fast as we could until between 2 and 3 o'clock in the afternoon by which time we were terribly damaged and had to leave the scene of action. Our large gun aft, 16-cm. Krupp, was disabled, and the two forward guns had their gear destroyed so that they could not be used, and to all intents and purposes the ship was useless, so Captain Fong decided to get out of the action and make the best of his way to Port Arthur to refit. The smoke was so dense that no one could see very much of what was going on from the deck, but from time to time we heard that this, that, or the other ship, was gone. Having left the fight in the *Tsi-yuen*, I know nothing of my own knowledge about what subsequently happened. We arrived at Port Arthur five or six hours before the remainder of the fleet, which came in about 8 o'clock. On the way in we had a collision with another vessel, which sank. From the injuries to the *Tsi-yuen* which are all abaft the stem, I should say the other ship rammed us. The water poured into the *Tsi-yuen* in a regular torrent, but we closed the water-tight doors forward and went on safely. I do not think that the charges of cowardice which have been brought against Captain Fong can be supported for a moment; he fought until his ship was no longer serviceable. As to the results of the Yalu battle, people on shore, who have been reading telegrams and newspapers, know more about them than people who were on the ships actually engaged in the fight, for the smoke was so thick that one only had a chance of knowing what was going on in his own ship." Mr. Hoffmann, on returning to Port Arthur, did not consider the *Tsi-yuen* seaworthy, and in consequence left the Chinese naval service, and not on account of Captain Fong's cowardice. He believes Captain Fong to have been the victim of a secret conspiracy.

off by a torpedo vessel, but some of her crew were killed ; the vessel is now visible, a useless shell, just above the wash of the sea at low water. This completes the list of Chinese casualties and losses.

"The torpedo boats found some difficulty in joining the fray ; the loss of the halyards, and in some cases, of colours made it difficult to distinguish friend from foe ; but the young officers in charge did well and acted fully up to their instructions to keep well under the lee of a big ship during fire and then dart out under a bank of smoke. Unfortunately for them their little vessels had been scouting for three weeks and had been overworked ; the result was lamentable ; when they opened out, their possible 20 knots sank to something between 14 and 15 ; the smoke rose rapidly, and long before the Schwartzkopf range was reached, they were seen and fired at. Oddly enough they were not hit once by anything worthy of notice, but on the other hand they effected nothing. The dreaded torpedo only scored once in the action and that in the case of the *King-yuen*, an issue entirely due to over-confidence and rashness.

"Meantime the two armoured vessels *Ting-yuen* and *Chen-yuen* were the recipients of the continued and persistent firing of the Japanese ; the *Chen-yuen* under the command of Commodore Lin, assisted by two foreigners, made grand practice and kept admirable discipline ; her frequent fires were extinguished promptly and the ship was admirably handled throughout the action. The foreign officers on board are both severely wounded, one in the arm while the other, through an inadvertence in the too prompt fire of one of the heavy guns, got his scalp and face badly burned and was subsequently wounded in the arms. So persistent was the fire from this vessel that the magazine was all but depleted, and she arrived at Port Arthur with only 20 rounds of heavy shell left ; they fired 148 six-inch shell and quite exhausted their smaller ammunition. Her fire was as effective as it was sustained, owing to the skill and coolness of a foreign expert. This ship's superstructures were almost completely destroyed, and a shell struck the spindle of the hydraulic gear of the port gun, putting it out of action. With this exception it is amazing to find how little damage the heavy fire did to the guns and machinery. Only three guns were dismantled in the whole Chinese fleet, and in no case were the engines, boilers, or hydraulic machinery (*Chen-yuen* excepted) injured. No casualties are reported from the engine rooms, where the behaviour was excellent. The *Lai-yuen*

(a sister ship to the *King-yuen* in build and armament) had her superstructure damaged by fire and shell more than any ship in the fleet, and was an appalling sight in Port Arthur ; the foreigners who have seen her deem it a marvel that she could ever have been brought into port, so completely wrecked is all the deck gear. Essentially, however, the ship is sound both in hull, armament, and engines.

"The *Ting-yuen* (flagship, 7,430 tons, 14½ knots, four 37 ton Krupp guns, two 4 ton do., eight machine guns) was the scene of some striking episodes. A heavy shell supposed but not known to be on the *ricochet*, struck the fighting top, killing instantly the 7 men in it, and knocking the entire gear into the sea. Another shot in its vagaries bent but did not break the steam pipe ; a third killed poor Nicholls, an ex-petty officer of the Royal Navy, who seeing another foreigner bleeding from a wound in the groin volunteered to take his place for a few minutes while he went below. This latter gentleman, by the bye, behaved with the utmost coolness and gallantry ; it was through his exertions that a terrific fire was got under forward when it had all but obtained the mastery. The Admiral and a third foreigner who had volunteered from the Customs service were violently thrown off the bridge by concussion and rendered senseless for some time ; it is supposed that the heavy guns were simultaneously fired from the barbette. On recovering, the Admiral was found to have sustained an injury to his foot, while an attendant in bearing help to his master was literally blown into the air and sea in infinitesimal pieces by a shell, an incident which profoundly affected the brave old soldier. The young Customs officer had the drum of his ear broken and some other wounds.

"About 3 o'clock the Japanese hauled off for consultation, but came on again and renewed the battle ; about 5 they took their final leave, the *Ting-yuen* and *Chen-yuen* following them up ; this was probably a bit of strategy on the part of the Japanese, for after running ten or twelve miles, five of them turned round and, to use the expressive phrase of a recipient, 'gave the big ships hell.' This was apparently the last kick, for to the unmitigated delight of the responsible officers they finally hauled off and disappeared to the southward. The two Chinese ships had no small ammunition left, and only a very limited supply of heavy shell, with which they pounded away at slow intervals, as there were two hours of day still left.

"The Admiral sent on a verbal message for the transports to come

along; but they had gone far up stream when they knew what was going on, and did not dare to move without more special orders. They left Tatungkow four days after the battle, saw the shell of the *Chao-yung* and the tops of the *Yang-wei* on the scene of the action; they called in at Port Arthur and crossed the Gulf in perfect safety.

"There are 252 wounded in the vessels at Port Arthur, the injuries of most of them being not at all serious, and not necessitating surgical interference. Every deck officer in the fleet they say is hurt; in this case it is simply marvellous that so few were killed. The *Ting-yuen* has 17, the *Chen yuen* 15, the other vessels about the same number, so that the total is less than 100, but to these must be added the 600 odd who perished by the sinking, etc., of the *Chih-yuen*, *King-yuen*, *Yang-wei*, including Mr. Purvis, the engineer who went down in the *Chih-yuen*."

The Chinese persist in their assertion that four Japanese men-of-war were sunk. The *North China Daily News*, especially, was positive that such was the case. "The foreign survivors to a man," it said, "regard the statement that the Japanese lost no ships as a barefaced lie;" but the same paper, a few days after making that assertion, stated that "the Chinese and Japanese fleets have been visited by men-of-war, and it is now believed that no Japanese ships were destroyed in the recent battle. That the Chinese were not more successful is attributed to ignorance of naval tactics, which led to grave mistakes being made in the manœuvring of the ships, or rather, to their being left to manœuvre themselves, instead of acting in concert on a reasoned plan, as the Japanese did"

The *China Mail* of Hongkong makes the following observations on the Chinese men-of-war in connection with the memorable naval engagement:—"The vessels that escaped from the engagement off the Yalu were not very seriously damaged about the hull, the shot and shell from the Japanese ships being aimed too high apparently in the majority of instances. Their upper structures are pretty well smashed, but that means nothing. One thing was evident at Port Arthur above everything else—that was, that the officers and sailors did not seem very anxious to get their ships refitted for sea. For more than a week after the fight the wreckage was allowed to lie about, and on board the *Ting-yuen* a decomposed body was discovered nearly a fortnight after. And the *Ting-yuen* is one of the crack ships of the Chinese navy! Nothing more disgusting or likely to knock the heart

out of a man could be imagined. The vessels that were lost might have been saved had it not been for cowardice and want of discipline. The *King-yuen* was not sunk by the Japanese, but was simply allowed to burn out. A shell from a hostile ship struck her woodwork, setting it on fire. It was only a small affair, and could have been easily extinguished with a few buckets of water. But no fire brigade had been organised on board, and everybody bolted away as far as he could till the fire spread over the whole ship. The *Lai-yuen* (?) was lost through want of proper organisation and discipline. Had it not been for the personal gallantry of Von Hanneken and Mr. Albrecht the *Ting-yuen* would also have been lost or else badly crippled. A shell struck her near the lazarette, right in the bow of the ship, and set some small things on fire. Everybody bolted. The fire gained ground rapidly. It was in close proximity to the forward torpedo room. Almost in less time than it takes to tell it, the smoke spread like a pall over the apparently doomed vessel. Everything was so upset that nobody thought of fighting the ship. Albrecht, however, by personal example mostly, got the pumps at work, and stood there amidst the shot and shell directing the jet of water until he had well-nigh flooded the room. It was a rare piece of gallantry, and had it occurred on a British or foreign man-of-war would have earned for him the highest honours."



THE HOSTILE SQUADRONS.

The following particulars of the men-of-war which took part in the Naval engagement are taken from Brassey's *Naval Annual* for 1894, except those of the *Kwang-chia*, which as they do not appear in Brassey's tables, were obtained from the Japanese *Official Gazette*.

ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE TABLES.

<i>a. c.</i>	- - -	Armoured cruiser.
<i>b.</i>	- - -	Barbette ship.
<i>c. b.</i>	- - -	Central-battery ship.
<i>c. d. s.</i>	- - -	Coast-defence ship.
comp.	- -	Compound or steel-faced armour.
<i>cr.</i>	- - -	Cruiser.
C. T.	- - -	Conning-tower.
f. tu.	- - -	Fixed tube for discharging Fish torpedoes.
<i>g. v.</i>	- - -	Gun-vessel.
l.	- - -	Light guns under 15 cwt., including boats' guns.
l. car.	- - -	Launching carriage for Fish torpedoes.
M.	- - -	Machine guns.
P.	- - -	Deck-protected throughout
<i>p.p.</i>	- - -	Partial deck protected
		{ The thickness of the deck protection is given in inches under the letters. P. or <i>pp</i> .
Q.F.	- - -	Quick or rapid firing guns.
sb.	- - -	Submerged tube for discharging Fish torpedoes.
<i>tor. cr.</i>	- - -	Torpedo-cruiser.

JAPANESE ARMoured SHIPS.

Class.	NAME.	Displacement.		Length.		Beam.		Draft of Water.		Propellers.		Indicated Horse-power.		Armour.		Deck Plating.	Armament.		Date of Launch.	Speed.
		Tons.	sq. ft.	ft.	in.	ft.	in.	ft.	in.	ft.	in.			Belt.	Battery.	In.	Guns.	Fish Torpedo Dischargers.		
a.c.	Chiyoda	(steel)	2450	308	6	42	6	14	0	2	0	5600		4½	...	1"	10 12-c.m. q.F., 14 47-c.m. do., 3 M.	3 l. car.	1889	Knots. 19.0
c.b.	Fu-So	(iron)	3718	220	0	48	0	18	4	2	4	3500		7	9	...	4 24-c.m. 15-ton (Krupp), 2 17-c.m. 6-ton do., 4 l., 5 M.	...	1877	13.2
a.c.	Hi-yei* (composite)		2200	231	0	40	9	17	4	1	4	2490		4½	3 17-c.m. 3½-ton (Krupp), 6 15-c.m. do.	...	1878	13.0

* This is not an armoured ship in the usual sense of the term. There is no armour as against end-on fire, and no armoured deck.

JAPANESE UNARMoured SHIPS.

Class.	NAME.	Displacement.		Length.		Beam.		Mean Draught of Water.		Propellers.		Indicated Horse-power.		Material of Hull.		Guns.	Fish Torpedo Dischargers.	Date of Launch.	Speed.
		Tons.	sq. ft.	ft.	in.	ft.	in.	ft.	in.	ft.	in.			steel	on barrette aft				
g.v.	Akagi	615	164	0	27	0	10	0	700		steel		1 24 c.m. (Krupp), 1 12-c.m. do., 2 M.	...	1888	Knots. 12.0
c.v.	Akatsushima ...	P. 3150	302	0	42	7	18	5	2	8400				"		1 32-c.m. 12 12-c.m. q.F., 6 M.	4 f. tu. or 1. car.	1892	19.0
c.d.s.	Hashidate	P. 4277	295	0	50	10	21	2	2	5400				steel 12" armour on barrette aft		1 32-c.m. (Canet), 11 12-c.m. q.F., 6 3-pdr. 6 M.	or 1. car.	1891	17.5
"	Itsukushima ...	P. 4277	295	0	50	10	21	2	2	5400				steel 12" armour on barrette forward		1 32-c.m. (Canet), 11 12-c.m. do., 5 6-4 f. tu.	or 1. car.	1889	17.5
"	Matsushima ...	P. 4277	295	0	50	10	21	2	2	5400				steel 12" armour on barrette forward		1 32-c.m. (Canet), 11 12-c.m. do., 5 6-4 f. tu.	or 1. car.	1890	17.5
c.v.	Naniwa	P. 3650	300	0	46	0	18	6	2	7255				steel		2 26-c.m. 28-ton (Armstrong), 6 15-c.m. 4 f. tu.	or 1. car.	1885	18.72
"	Takachihio	P. 3650	300	0	46	0	18	6	2	7500				steel		5-ton (Krupp), 2 q.F., 10 M.	or 1. car.	1885	18.72
"	Yoshino	P. 4150	350	0	46	6	17	0	2	15,000				"		5-ton do., 2 q.F., 10 M.	or 1. car.	1892	23.03
		4½"-1½"														4 6-in. q.F., 8 47-in. do., 22 3-pdr. do.	5 f. tu. or 1. car.		

CHINESE ARMoured SHIPS.

Class.	NAME.	Displacement.	Length.	Beam.	Draught of Water.	Propellers.	Indicated Horse-power.	Armour.		Back-ing.	Armament.		Date of Launch.	Speed.
		Tons.	ft. in.	ft. in.	ft. in.			Belt.	Turret or Barbette.	Deck Plating.	Guns.	Fish Torpedo Dis-chargers.		
b.	Chen-yuen (steel)	7430	308 5	59 0	20 0	2	6200	14 comp.	Inches. 12 comp.	Inches. 14	4 30½-c.m. Krupp, 2 15-c.m. 4-ton do., 8 m., 21.	2 1. car.	1892	Knots. 14.5
"	King-yuen (steel)	2850	270 0	40 0	16 6	2	3600	9½	8 comp.	3"	2 8½-in. 10-ton, 2 6-in. 7 m.	1f. tu. sb. 31 car.	1887	16.5
c.d.s.	Ping-yuen (steel)	2850	200 0	40 0	16 0	2	2400	8	5 barbette and C. T. 8 comp.	2"	1 10½-in. Krupp, 2 6-in. do., 8 q. f.	4 f. tu. or 1. car.	1890	10.5
b.	Lai-yuen (steel)	2850	270 0	40 0	16 6	2	3600	9½	8 comp.	3"	2 8½-in. 10-ton, 2 6-in. 4 ton, 7 m.	1f. tu. sb. 31 car	1887	16.5
"	Ting-yuen (steel)	7430	308 5	59 0	20 0	2	6200	14 comp.	12 comp.	3"	4 30½-c.m. Krupp, 2 15-c.m. 4-ton do., 8 m., 21.	2 1. car.	1881	14.5

CHINESE UNARMoured SHIPS.

Class.	NAME.	Displacement.	Length.	Beam.	Draught of Water.	Propellers.	Indicated Horse-power.	Material of Hull.	Guns.	Fish Torpedo Dis-chargers.	Date of Launch.	Speed.
		Tons.	ft. in.	ft. in.	ft. in.							
cr.	Chao-yung ... pp.	1350	210 0	32 0	15 8	2	2677	steel	2 10-in. Armstrong, 4 4.7-in. q. f., 73 f. tu.	1881	Knots. 16.8
"	Chih-yuen ... P. 4"-2"	2300	250 0	38 0	15 0	2	5500	steel bar-bette 10"	3 8-in. 12-ton, 2 6-in. 4-ton, 7 57-m.m. 4 f. tu.	or 1. car.	1886	18.0
"	Chiu-g-yuen P. 4"-2"	2300	250 0	38 0	15 0	2	5500	steel barbette 10"	3 8-in. 12-ton, 2 6-in. 4-ton do., 6 m. or 1. car.	or 1. car.	1886	18.0
"	Kwang-chia ...	1296	221 0	13 0	...	1600	57-m.m. q. f., 2 47-m.m. do., 8 m. do., 6 m.	8 27-or 1. car.		
cr. cr.	Kwang-ping ...	1100	2	3400	steel	3 15-c.m., 4 10.5-c.m., 1 7.5-c.m., 4 47-m.m. Hotchkiss, 2 m.	1887	14.7
cr.	Tsi-yuen ... P. 4"-2"	2355	236 3	33 0	15 9	2	2800	steel	1 15-c.m., 1 12-c.m., 4 m.	1891
"	Yang-wei ... pp.	1350	210 0	32 0	15 8	2	2550	barbette 10"	2 21-c.m. Krupp, 1 15-c.m. do., 9 m.	4 f. tu. or 1. car.	1883	15.0
									2 10-in. 25-ton Armstrong, 4 4.7-in. q. f., 7 m., 2 l.	3 f. tu. or 1. car.	1881	16.0

DIAGRAMS

SHOWING

THE MOVEMENTS OF THE HOSTILE SQUADRONS.

In the accompanying diagrams the positions and movements of the hostile squadrons are shown.

In the map of the Korean Sea, the route of the first flying squadron is given, together with the approximate points at which the Chinese men-of-war were sunk.

The abbreviations used in the diagrams are the following:—

The ships with only two strokes are Japanese, while the Chinese are all shaded.

JAPANESE.		CHINESE.
<i>a</i>	<i>Yoshino.</i>	<i>m</i> <i>Chao-yung.</i>
<i>b</i>	<i>Takachiho.</i>	<i>n</i> <i>Yang-wei.</i>
<i>c</i>	<i>Akitsushima.</i>	<i>o</i> <i>Lai-yuen.</i>
<i>d</i>	<i>Naniwa.</i>	<i>p</i> <i>King-yuen.</i>
<i>e</i>	<i>Matsushima.</i>	<i>q</i> <i>Ting-yuen.</i>
<i>f</i>	<i>Chiyoda.</i>	<i>r</i> <i>Chen-yuen.</i>
<i>g</i>	<i>Itsukushima.</i>	<i>s</i> <i>Chih-yuen.</i>
<i>h</i>	<i>Hashidate.</i>	<i>t</i> <i>Ching-yuen.</i>
<i>i</i>	<i>Hiei.</i>	<i>u</i> <i>Kwang-ping.</i>
<i>j</i>	<i>Fuso.</i>	<i>v</i> <i>Tsi-yuen.</i>
<i>k</i>	<i>Akagi.</i>	<i>w</i> <i>Kwang-chia.</i>
<i>l</i>	<i>Saikyo.</i>	<i>x</i> <i>Ping-yuen.</i>

Sk. stands for sunk. A and B are the two positions assumed by the squadrons.


Fig. 1. The position at 12.45, when the squadrons are approaching and the Chinese have begun to fire.

Fig. 2. At 1.20, when the flying squadron (in B) is veering 16 points to port.

Fig. 3. The flying squadron, after being called back to the main squadron, has started again at 2.20 to the aid of the *Hiei* and *Akagi*, leaving the *Saikyo* exposed to the Chinese fire.

Fig. 4. The main squadron attacks the two great battle-ships, while the flying squadron goes in pursuit of the rest of the Chinese fleet.

Fig. 5. The flying squadron is called back after sinking the *King-yuen*.



Cont in

Fig. 2

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Cont. fig. 3



Cont. from
fig. 3

Main Sq.

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p Sk

Cont
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Fig. 4





ADMIRAL COUNT SAIGO,
JAPANESE MINISTER OF WAR AND NAVY.



VICE-ADMIRAL ITO,
COMMANDER OF THE JAPANESE STANDING SQUADRON.



VICE-ADMIRAL VISCOUNT KABAYAMA,
CHIEF OF THE JAPANESE NAVAL GENERAL STAFF.

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COUNT LI-HUNGCHANG,
MINISTER OF WAR AND VICEROY OF CHIHLI.



ADMIRAL TING-JOOCHANG,
COMMANDER OF THE CHINESE PEIYANG SQUADRON.



KOO-KESHING,
CHIEF OF THE CHINESE NAVAL GENERAL STAFF.

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THE "MATSUSHIMA" AFTER THE BATTLE.



THE "MATSUSHIMA"; THE GREAT CANET_GUN.

40 1980
1980 1980



CAPTAIN OMOTO,
COMMANDER OF THE "MATSUSHIMA."



LATE COMMANDER SAKAMOTO,
COMMANDER OF THE "AKAGI."



LIEUTENANT SATO,
CHIEF NAVIGATING OFFICER OF THE "AKAGI."



THE "AKAGI" AFTER THE BATTLE, SHOWING THE EFFECT OF A SHELL ON THE SHIELD OF THE FOURTH GUN.

1880
1881
1882
1883
1884
1885
1886
1887
1888
1889
1890
1891
1892
1893
1894
1895
1896
1897
1898
1899
1900





9. THE "AKAGI" AFTER THE BATTLE, SHOWING THE DAMAGES ON THE STARBOARD QUARTERDECK.



10. THE NAVAL BATTLE. — PHOTOGRAPHED FROM THE "SAIKYO-MARU" (2)





THE CHINESE BATTLESHIP "CHEN-YUEN."



THE CHINESE BATTLESHIP "TING-YUEN."

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13. THE NAVAL BATTLE. - PHOTOGRAPHED FROM THE "SAIKYO-MARU" (3)



THE CHINESE MAN-OF-WAR "KING-YUEN" (SUNK).



THE CHINESE CRUISER "CHIH-YUEN" (SUNK).




THE CHINESE CRUISER "YANG-WEI" (SUNK).

清國軍艦揚威

TO THE
MEMBERS OF THE
COMMISSIONERS OF THE
LAND OFFICE



15. THE BURNING OF THE "CHAO-YUNG." - PHOTOGRAPHED FROM THE "SAIKYO-MARU."











THE JAPANESE CRUISER "HIEI."




THE JAPANESE MERCHANT CRUISER "SAIKYO."

70 3841
August 1900











THE "MATSUBISHIMA," AFTER THE BATTLE, FIRING A SALUTE.





25. THE NAVAL BATTLE ; JAPANESE MARINES FIRING MACHINE GUNS.



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
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